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IN CRIMINAL CASES -

The criminal trial has been traditionally open to the public in AngloSaxon procedure,1 as it was in Roman and other civilized societies of
an earlier time. 2 The public trial of today, however, has been subjected
to considerable criticism on the ground that there is a tendency for
criminal trials to degenerate into public spectacles, frequently interrupting the orderly procedure of justice, and not infrequently actually
prejudicing the accused. 3 If no useful purpose is served by the pres20 Hope, "Officiousness," 15 CoRN. L.Q. 205 at 239 (1930).
21 2 JoNES, MORTGAGES 572 (1928).
22Bartels v. Seefus, 132 Neb. 841, 273 N.W. 485 (1937); Snow v. Arnold, 132 Fla.
435, 181 s. 7 (1938).
23 Other cases involving the self-interest justification include the discharge of tax liens
by mortgagees, De Haven v. Roscon Building & Loan Assn., 107 Pa. Super. 459, 164 A.
69 (1933), and cases collected in 61 A.L.R. 587 at 601 (1929) and 106 A.L.R. 1212 at
1217 (1937); and the discharge by a wife of liens on her husband's property, Elmora &
West End Building & Loan Assn. v. Dancy, 108 N.J. Eq. 542, 155 A. 796 (1931); Moody
v. Isselstein, 106 Wash. 294, 179 P. 855 (1919).

lJn re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 68 S.Ct. 499 (1948); Radin, "The Right to a Public
Trial," 6 TEMP. L.Q. 381 (1932).
2 JoLOWICZ, HISTORICAL !NrnoDUCTION TO RoMAN LAW 318-327, 407-409 (1932).
3 Radin, "The Right to a Public Trial," 6 TEMP. L.Q. 381 (1932).
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ence of the idle public during the deadly serious determination of guilt
or innocence, should not the judge, subject to the right of admittance
of any whom the accused desires in attendance, be allowed to exclude
all who have no special interest in the proceeding?4 This comment
will consider that question.

I. Right of the General Public to Attend Criminal Trials
Although historically the public trial did not seem to develop out
of any particular solicitude for the person on trial,5 the popular conception today is that the right of a public trial exists primarily for the
benefit of the accused, and that the incidental observer attends not as
a matter of right but as a matter of courtesy.6 Some extremists have
gone so far as to urge that the judge, with the consent of the accused
and the prosecutor, may arbitrarily exclude spectators from the entire
proceedings. 7 While there certainly are cases supporting the premise
that incidental attendance may be barred if the accused waives his
right to a public trial,8 the same courts recognize that the people do
have an interest in seeing that such proceedings are kept public. 0 It
does not appear that any courts have granted requests to exclude the
public unless such exclusion was felt necessary in the interest of justice.10 Though there is no specific constitutional safeguard protecting
the public from arbitrary exclusion,11 · ordinarily all who desire to
attend a criminal trial are entitled to be admitted as long as there are
facilities available,12 and, despite a few indiscreet statements to the
4 In exclusion orders it is usual practice to except persons the accused requests to have
in attendance, and persons having a legitimate interest in the proceedings are entitled to
remain as a matter of right. Beauchamp v. Cahill, 297 Ky. 505, 180 S.W. (2d) 423
(1944).
5 43 CAsB AND CoMMBNT No. 3, p. 8 (1937).
6 The view seems to stem primarily from a statement by Cooley referring only to
constitutional provisions and not considering common law custom. CooLBY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, 8th ed., 647 (1927). It does not follow, as some have assumed, that
there is no public interest worthy of protection.
7 LeViness, "Crime News," 66 U.S. L. REv. 370 at 371 (1932).
s United States v. Sorrentino, (3d Cir. 1949) 175 F. (2d) 721. Failure to object to
an exclusion order has been held to constitute a waiver. Keddington v. State, 19 Ariz. 457,
172 P. 273 (1918). Contra: State v. Hensley, 75 Ohio St. 255, 79 N.E. 462 (1906).
9 United States v. Kohli, (3d Cir. 1949) 172 F. (2d) 919.
10 Green v. State, 135 Fla. 17, 184 S. 504 (1938).
11 One court has indicated that the state constitutional provision guaranteeing public
trial is a safeguard meant to protect the public as well as the accused. State v. Keeler, 52
Mont. 205, 156 P. 1080 (1916).
12 Daubney v. Cooper, 5 Man. & Ry. 314, 10 B. & C. 237, 109 Eng. Rep. 438 (1829).
Recovery allowed in assanlt action against defendants who ejected plaintiff pursuant to
court order.
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contrary, most jurisdictions recognize that a judge has no authority to
bar citizens indiscriminately from the courts.13 In a number of states
legislative enactments require all judicial proceedings to be public, with
the exception of certain enumerated classes of cases.14
The basis of such a right in the public is a recognition of the fact
that the people have an interest in knowing how the judicial system
is functioning,15 and in seeing that the accused is given a fair and
impartial trial and that the prosecution is accorded a proper opportunity to present its case.16 Publicity in criminal proceedings constitutes
an ever present check on the judge, stimulating his sense of responsibility and curbing his prejudices.17 Furthermore, it provides a security
for the conscientious jurist who has no reason to conceal his activity,
thwarting attempts to discredit him by false accusations concerning his
impartiality or competence. As continental experience has demonstrated, judicial laxity and venality increase in the absence of critical
scrutiny.18 Unless the necessity of excluding the public in the interest
of a fair trial outweighs the advantages to be gained from publicity,
the judge is not entitled to the prerogative either by his own motion
or in concurrence with the desires of the parties.

II. Right of the Press to Attend Criminal Trials
In America the fourth estate is an institution of special privilege;
it has been accorded the most solicitous treatment in the courtrooms
of the land, securing admittance in numerous instances when the doors
have been closed in the face of the masses. 19 In general it has been

13 Williamson v. Lacy, 86 Me. 80, 29 A. 943 (1893). In action against judge by
persons excluded from a trial, recovery was denied solely on the ground that a judge is not
answerable in damages when acting in a judicial capacity. Accord: Crisfield v. Perine, 15
Hun. (N.Y.) 200 (1878), affd. 81 N.Y. 622 (1880).
14 Juvenile court cases are regularly conducted in privacy. In civil litigation divorce
cases and cases involving trade secrets are frequently heard aBsentia the public. Statutes
are collected in 6 W1GMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §1834 (1940).
15 State v. Hensley, 75 Ohio St. 255, 79 N.E. 462 (1906), noted 20 HARv. L. fu:v.
489 (1907).
16 State v. Beckstead, 96 Utah 528 at 534, 88 P. (2d) 461 (1939).
17 1 BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JumcrAL EVIDENCE 522, 523, 568-572 (1827).
lSEsMEIN, HISTORY oF CoNTINENTAL CmMINAL PROCEDURE 3, 145-164, 165-172,
397, 439, 442 (1913). It was not the secret procedure that was so objectionable; it was
the practices accompanying it.
19 Instances in which the press has been excluded from criminal trials are exceedingly
rare. People v. Hall, 51 App. Div. 57, 64 N.Y.S. 433 (1900) (order loosely enforced).
In determining whether the accused has been denied a public trial emphasis is frequently
placed on the fact that the press is not excluded. People v. Byrnes, 84 Cal. App. (2d) 72
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recognized that the press, as the representative of the people, is entitled
to discuss trial proceedings freely2° and can, if necessary, compel officials to make judicial records available for that purpose.21 However,
a review of its conduct has led serious thinkers to conclude that the
press is motivated only by a desire to increase circulation, and the illeffects of such a policy outweigh any possible services which might
result from complete coverage of criminal trials. 22 In support of this
premise the picture painted is indeed black. Sensational cases are
tried in the press before reaching the courtroom. During the trial news
services invade the premises with such disconcerting paraphernalia as
telegraph and recording apparatus, Hash cameras, microphones and,
recently, television equipment. 23 In this turbulent atmosphere twelve
forgotten men try to do justice while a disgusted citizenry concludes
that criminal trials are a farce. 24 It is apparent that such situations call
for effective sanctions, but does exclusion of the press constitute the
proper remedy?
Unlike British courts, which freely inflict contempt penalties on
newssheets jeopardizing impartial determination of litigation,25 the
American bench has seldom invoked the contempt process in similar

at 76, 190 P. (2d) 290 (1948), noted 22 TBMP. L.Q. 232 (1948). A court may be
entitled to exclude newsmen from a courtroom in order to prevent publication of salacious
details. See Bloomer v. Bloomer, 197 Wis. 140, 221 N.W. 734 (1928) (divorce proceeding). It is doubtful that a court can effectively enforce the order by forbidding publication
of the testimony, at least in the absence of a statute. In re Shortridge, 99 Cal. 526, 34 P.
227 (1893).
20 "A trial is a public event. What transpires in the court room is public property."
Craig v. Hamey, 331 U.S. 367 at 374, 67 S.Ct. 1249 (1947).
21 Bend Publishing Co. v. Haner, 118 Ore. 105, 244 P. 868 (1926). In the absence
of a statute, the right of private persons to have access to public records is more doubtful.
22 See White, ''Newspaper and Radio Coverage of Criminal Trials: A Modern
Dilemma," 41 J. CruM. L. 306 (1950).
23 Televising of courtroom scenes during a murder trial has been held to be improper,
but not reversible error. People v. Stroble, 36 Cal. (2d) 615, 226 P. (2d) 330 (1951),
noted in 25 TBMP. L.Q. 91 (1951). Courts have acted to exclude cameras and radio
equipment from courtrooms; there has also been legislative activity in this respect. Yesawich,
"Televising and Broadcasting Trials," 37 CoRN. L.Q. 701 at 712-717 (1952). Taking
a photograph in the courtroom in violation of court order has been cited in contempt. Ex
parte Sturm, 152 Md. 114, 136 A. 312 (1927).
24 It is argued that in sensational criminal trials in which there is a large attendance,
counsel are likely to address their arguments to the audience and the press rather than to
the jury. While this is a valid criticism, is it proper to treat such practice as a defect in
the system of public trial when the real fault lies in the individuals involved and can be
remedied in most instances by a word from the bench instead of excluding the public
before trial begins?
25 Goodhart, "Newspapers and Contempt of Court in English Law," 48 HARv. L.
RBv. 885 (1935).
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situations.26 It is not because our courts lack authority to punish abuses
of the press which have the effect of preventing a fair trial. 27 Hesitancy
seems to stem primarily from the political processes by which judges
are selected.28 Perhaps for the same reason the courts have been even
less inclined to exclude the press from criminal proceedings.29 Although
courtrooms occasionally have been temporarily cleared,30 there is little
precedent for a sweeping order of exclusion barring the press throughout the trial. 31 Since freedom of the press is not an unabridged license,
the press, like the public, should be subject to temporary orders of
exclusion. Furthermore, a judge should have authority to admit members of the press conditionally, subject to prior promises not to publish
specified matters if the judge considers them prejudicial. It has been
suggested that such power might be unconstitutional32 as it is in the
nature of a prior restraint on publication.33 Although permanent
restraints of such a nature may be objectionable, there is authority for
conditional admission of press representatives upon agreement not to
comment on the trial until the jury has rendered a verdict.34 Permanent exclusion from a trial, on the other hand, is an extreme measure
which penalizes the responsible press for the misconduct of an irresponsible minority. Such action is not necessary to secure a fair trial
for the accused, since prejudice usually results not from a truthful
report of the trial proceedings which the jury hears and evaluates for
itself, but from pre-trial accounts which render it impossible to select
impartial jurors and from statements circulated during the trial which
are not traceable to anything stated on the witness stand. The only
remaining reasons for excluding the press would be to protect the
26 Nelles and King, "Contempt by Publication in the United States," 28 CoL. L.
REv. 525-562 (1928).
27Tate v. State ex rel. Raine, 132 Tenn. 131, 177 S.W. 69 (1915).
28 If a publication interferes with the due administration of justice, contempt proceedings ·are probably still available despite the doctrine of the Bridges case which limits the
power of summary contempt where criticism is directed against the bench to instances
constituting a clear and _present danger to impartial determination of litigation. Bridges v.
California, 314 U.S. 252, 62 S.Ct. 190 (1941). The question appears to be still open if
the publication is of a nature tending to influence the jury. Baltimore Radio Show v.
State, 193 Md. 300, 67 A. (2d) 497 (1949), cert. den. 338 U.S. 912, 70 S.Ct. 252 (1950).
29.Perry, "The Courts, the Press, and the Public," 30 MJ:cH. L. REv. 228 (1931).
30 People v. Hall, 50 App. Div. 57, 64 N.Y.S. 433 (1900); Hogan v. State, 191 Ark.
437, 86 s.w. (2d) 931 (1935).
31 Occasionally, in the interest of a fair trial, even an accurate account of proceedings
should not be published. 2 BxsHOP, CRIMINAL LAW §259 (1923).
32 Comment, 63 HARv. L. REv. 840 (1950).
33 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 51 S.Ct. 625 (1931).
34 United States v. Holmes, (C.C. Pa. 1842) 26 Fed. Cas. 360, No. 15,383.
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judge from press retaliation for his handling of a case, a protection to
which, apparently, he is not entitled;35 to protect innocent witnesses
from being exploited in the press, a protection not generally accorded;
or to protect the public itself from salacious details of sensational cases,
a protection which a New York trial court recently deemed more
important than the accused's right to a public trial. 36

III. Accused's Right to a Public Trial
While the casual observer has seldom contested the authority of a
judge to exclude him, the accused has frequently asserted that such
exclusion is a violation of his right to a public trial, a right guaranteed
by the Sixth Amendment in federal cases and also by most state constitutions.37 In some courts the phrase "public trial" has come to mean
a trial which is not a secret trial. The constitutional right is satisfied
if court officers, witnesses, persons otherwise connected with the proceedings and personal friends of the accused are permitted to attend.38
This is considered sufficient to avert the abuses of earlier secret proceedings which the constitutional provisions were designed to prevent,
and the accused is entitled to no more. Other courts construe the
phrase to mean a trial open to the general public, recognizing, however,
that the right of the accused to a public trial is a relative, not an absolute right and may be abridged if it becomes necessary to do so in order
to administer justice. A public trial, they premise, means something
more than a fair trial and therefore is not to be strictly limited to classes
of persons necessary to insure a fair trial. 39 In a few courts it has also
been suggested that the accused must demonstrate that the exclusion
order is in fact prejudicial,40 but the majority of courts hold that denial
of the constitutional right is prejudicial in itself.41 In support of the
majority position it can be argued that prejudice is likely to occur

35 See

note 28 supra.
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1953, p. 1: I. Several newspapers appealed from the order
excluding the press. Justice Schreiber of the New York Supreme Court ruled the newspapers had no constitutional right to attend all criminal trials and report all proceedings
therein. United Press Assns. v. Valente, 120 N.Y.S. (2d) 642 (1953). On appeal to the
appellate division the ruling was upheld (3-2 decision) .on the ground that the petitioners
had no standing in court to protest the exclusion order. 120 N.Y.S. (2d) 174 (1953).
37 Comment, 49 CoL. L. REv. 110 (1949).
38 State v. Nyhus, 19 N.D. 326, 124 N.W. 71 (1909).
39 People v. Murray, 89 Mich. 276, 50 N.W. 995 (1891); People v. Greeson, 230
Mich. 124, 203 N.W. 141 (1925).
40 Benedict v. People, 23 Colo. 126, 46 P. 637 (1896).
41 People v. Hartman, 103 Cal. 242, 37 P. 153 (1894).
36
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which may never be exposed.42 Possibilities of prejudice are varied.
If the accused is innocent, it is important to him that he be exonerated
not only in the eyes of the jury but likewise in the eyes of the community where he is known. Loose-mouthed assertions published for all
the world to read cast a pall of guilt on a person which lingers even
after he is found innocent; to deny a public trial is to deny an opportunity to raise the pall.43 While courts recognize that an exclusion
order should not reflect prejudicially on the accused or tend to discredit
him in the eyes of the jury,44 little consideration has been given to the
fact that in certain instances the very act of excluding the public will
adversely influence the jury as to the enormity of the crime or unduly
impress them as to the importance of the evidence.45 Wigmore points
out two further benefits of publicity: (1) The presence of an audience
will tend to prevent misstatements on the part of witnesses who have
greater reason to believe that a falsehood will be exposed if informed
observers are apprised of their testimony;46 and (2) publicity may
secure useful testimony previously unknown to the accused, particularly when the statements are made available to a wide audience
through the press.47 One further argument advanced in support of a
public trial is that the accused may be unable to prove unfair treatment
at the hands of the court unless the proceeding is public,4 8 but in this
respect the presence of his friends would assure witnesses available to
testify in his behalf.
Recently, in In re Oliver,49 the United States Supreme Court ruled
that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required a
42 Davis v. United States, (8th Cir. 1917) 247 F. 394.
43 See TAFT, LAW REFORM 142-148 (1926).
44 Dutton v. State, 123-Md. 373 at 387, 91 A. 417 (1914).

Examining Italians for
weapons as they entered courtroom held not prejudicial when jury was not aware of that
fact. People v. Mangiapane, 219 Mich. 62 at 68, 188 N.W. 401 (1922). But moving
trial to a theater to accommodate spectators was cause for reversal as jury could infer therefrom the court felt it immaterial how accused was tried. Roberts v. State, 100 Neb. 199,
158 N.W. 930 (1916).
45 State v. Osborne, 54 Ore. 289, 103 P. 62 (1909). It would seem that if the public
is ordered excluded the ju.'"}' should be instructed that the exclusion should not be construed
as an indication of guilt on the part of the accused or of truthfulness of the witnesses
about to testify, yet such instructions do not seem to be requested or given. Compare the
instructions given when accused is brought into court manacled. Mahley v. State, 49 Ohio
App. 359 at 376, 197 N.E. 339 (1934).
46 This premise appears in the works of Blackstone and other early writers, 3 BLACKST.,
CoMM., Wendell ed., 372-373 (1854). See also 1 BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL
EVIDENCE 522, 523, 568-572 (1827).
47 6 WrGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §1834 (1940).
48 Tilton v. State, 5 Ga. App. 59, 62 S.E. 651 (1908).
49 333 U.S. 257, 68 S.Ct. 499 (1948), noted 39 J. CnIM. L. 359 (1948).
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public trial in state criminal proceedings. As the case was an extreme
one involving summary contempt punishment of a witness in a secret
one-judge grand jury inquiry, it was not necessary to define sharply
the scope of the newly recognized right. In interpreting the Sixth
Amendment, the lower federal courts have imposed severe restrictions
on the discretion of the trial judge to exclude the public in federal
criminal cases. 50 Although early cases supported broad discretionary
exclusion power in the judges,51 the later cases are of the view that
except in extraordinary instances exclusion of the general public over
the accused's objection constitutes a denial of a public trial.5 2 While
it might be argued that the Fourteenth Amendment entitles the accused
to similar treatment in state proceedings, the law has not tended to
impart the same strict construction to the fundamental concepts constituting due process under the Fourteenth Amendment as has been
imparted to the correlative rights specifically enumerated in the first
ten amendments. 53 The refusal of the Supreme Court on several
occasions to review cases in which it was alleged that the accused had
been denied due process under the Fourteenth Amendment is perhaps
indicative of a reluctance to interfere with local discretion in interpreting the nature of a public trial so long as the determination does not
deprive the accused of a fair trial. 54 So far the lower federal courts
have not carried over the interpretation of "public trial" under the Sixth
Amendment to the Fourteenth.55

IV. Discretionary Authority of a Judge to Exclude the Public
and Press from a Criminal Trial
Circumstances may arise, it is universally conceded, in which it
becomes necessary for the judge to exclude a part or all of the public
and in such instances neither the public nor the accused has cause for
objection. While there is general agreement recognizing authority to
exclude in a number of situations, there is complete disagreement in
50 Davis v. United States, (8th Cir. 1917) 247 F.
51 Reagan v. United States, (9th Cir. 1913) 202

394.
F. 488; Callahan v. United States,

(9th Cir. 1917) 240 F. 683.
52 United States v. Kohli, (3d Cir. 1949) 172 F. (2d) 919, noted with approval 28
TEX. L. Rav. 265 (1949).
53 Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 at 462, 62 S.Ct. 1252 (1942).
54 Commonwealth v. Blondin, 324 Mass. 564, 87 N.E. (2d) 455 (1949), cert. den.
339 U.S. 984, 70 S.Ct. 1004 (1950), reviewed on writ of habeas corpus in Melanson v.
O'Brien, (1st Cir. 1951) 191 F. (2d) 963 at 965. See also Moore v. State, 151 Ga. 648,
108 S.E. 47 (1921), writ of error dismissed 260 U.S. 702, 43 S.Ct. 98 (1922).
55 Melanson v. O'Brien, (1st Cir. 1951) 191 F. (2d) 963.
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others. Ordinarily, a public trial entitles the general public and the
press to free access at all times,56 but occasional sanction has been given
to temporary barring of doors when the continuous passage of people
proves to be disruptive of proceedings. 57 Particular individuals may
be ejected if they prove to be disorderly. 58 If it becomes necessary to
clear the courtroom in order to maintain decorum, the judge has power
to do so. 59 He may also impose restrictions on attendance in the interest
of public health. 60 Ordinarily the trial must be conducted in a manner
enabling all present to understand what is taking place,61 but in exceptional circumstances, as in instances requiring earphones to hear transcribed or recorded broadcasts, practical considerations will govern. 62
Out of special regard for the interest of a witness, the courts have
sometimes felt it necessary to exclude the general public. If a witness
justifiably fears that circulation of his testimony will subject him to
physical violence in retaliation, the public may be excluded to assure
his safety.63 However, if the anticipated testimony is merely personally
embarrassing to the witness, some courts will not exclude the public,
at least in cases where the witness is an adult.64 The possible embarrassment is considered temporary only, whereas the accused may be
irreparably injured. Other courts feel that innocent witnesses should
not be degraded or subjected to humiliation, particularly when the
56 People v. Murray, 89 Mich. 276, 50 N.W. 995 (1891). However, witnesses may
be excluded from the courtroom and kept apart from each other. State v. Worthen, 124
Iowa 408, 100 N.W. 330 (1904). While jury deliberations are secret, the jury must be
recalled into open court for further instructions. Arrington v. Robertson, (3d Cir. 1940)
114 F. (2d) 821. A grand jury indictment must be returned in open court. Zugar v.
State, 194 Ga. 285, 21 S.E. (2d) 647 (1942).
57People v. Buck, 46 Cal. App. (2d) 558, 116 P. (2d) 160 (1941) (doors locked
to obviate disturbance while instructions were being given to the jury).
58 State v. Copp, 15 N.H. 212 (1844).
59 Lide v. State, 133 Ala. 43, 31 S. 953 (1901).
60People v. Miller, 257 N.Y. 54, 177 N.E. 306 (1931).
61 People v. Southack, (Cal. 1952) 241 P. (2d) 558, modified on other grounds, 248
P. (2d) 12.
62 D'Aquino v. United States, (9th Cir. 1951) 192 F. (2d) 338, cert. den. 343 U.S.
935, 72 S.Ct. 772 (1952).
63 Commonwealth v. Principatti, 260 Pa. 587 at 598, 104 A. 53 (1918). If the
presence of a hostile audience creates an atmosphere inimical to accused's right to a fair
trial, there may be a denial of due process. See Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 43 S.Ct.
265 (1923).
64 Green v. State, 135 Fla. 17, 184 S. 504 (1938). Exclusion to prevent embarrassment to an innocent victim requires an assumption that the victim's recital of shame is true
and the accused's denial or plea of consent is false. Since there is particular danger in
cases involving sex crimes that an order will exclude persons who may be capable of
impeaching the one witness testifying against the accused, it has been suggested that
embarrassment alone does not justify exclusion. Tanksley v. United States, (9th Cir.
1944) 145 F. (2d) 58, noted 8 UNIV. DETROIT L.J. 129 (1945).
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accused is the cause of the situation.65 When the humiliation is so
extreme that the witness cannot testify coherently in the presence of
an audience, the public may be excluded in order to facilitate the
testimony. 66
In cases where the evidence contemplated is of a particularly
obscene and .immoral nature, the courts are widely split as to the
advisability of excluding the public, agreeing only that exclusion of
immature persons from the proceedings is proper. 67 In some states,
statutes provide that the public may be excluded in such cases, and
the courts have generally ruled that these statutes do not conflict with
the state constitutional provisions requiring a public trial. 68 These
courts minimize the latent dangers accompanying restricted publicity
of trials and accentuate the benefits thereby inuring to the public.
The audience, it is argued, is composed for the most part of individuals
drawn by the lurid and sensational who are not motivated by any
desire to assure themselves that justice is being done and the courts
are properly functioning. If the accused desires exclusion of the public
and the press in such cases because their presence may create an
atmosphere liostile to his interest, there is no serious objection to
excluding onlookers temporarily on the ground that testimony is unfit
to be heard. However, the rights of the accused should not be subordinated to the motives drawing those in attendance if he believes
their presence is beneficial. It is doubtful whether the testimony presented in court will ordinarily have any serious deleterious effect on
the standards of morality.

V. Conclusions
Our courts have operated successfully for nearly two centuries
under a theory which permits exclusion of the public only when a
particularly grave reason exists and only so long as that reason exists.
Any exclusion which is more than temporary in nature renders the
trial secret so far as the public is concerned. A judge is not defenseless.
He can maintain order and protect witnesses by temporary exclusion,
and there is no necessity for permanently excluding the press so long
65Dutton v. State, 123 Md. 373, 91 A. 417 (1914).
66 State v. Callahan, 100 Minn. 63, 110 N.W. 342 (1907).
67Wade v. State, 207 Ala. 1, 92 S. 101 (1921).
68 Moore v. State, 151 Ga. 648, 108 S.E. 47 (1921); contra: People v. Yeager, 113
Mich. 228, 71 N.W. 491 (1897).
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as the judge is armed with the sword of contempt and has the courage
to use it. It is one thing to place discretion in the hands of the jurist;
it is another to elevate him to the exalted status of conservator of the
public morals and censor of the public press. 69

Carl S. Krueger, S.Ed.
69 Further references: 49 CoL. L. REv. 110-118 (1949); 35 MICH. L. REv. 474
(1937); 14 AM. JUR., Criminal Law §§139-143 (1938); 156 A.L.R. 265 (1945); .Alrnorr,
CRIMINAL TRIAL PRACTICE, 4th ed., Viesselman, §240 (1931); ORPmLD, CRIMINAL
l'aOCEDURE FROM AruraST TO APPEAL 352, 353, 385-387 (1947).

